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OPPORTUNISM AS CRUCIBLE: RETHINKING EQUITY IN VIEW OF
RELIANCE INTERESTS AND LEGAL EVOLUTION
John S. Ehrett*
This Article offers and defends a nuanced definition of opportunism
in the context of legal decision-making by differentiating between
opportunism in the broad sense and the particularized phenomenon of
cognizably malignant opportunism. It subsequently proceeds by developing
a normative critique of the case for broader invocation of counteropportunistic equitable remedies, alongside a defense of the reliance and
gap-filling functions performed by opportunistic actors. Centrally, I
challenge the suggestion that the existence of opportunism in private law
warrants a revival of the doctrines of ex post equity. I argue, instead, that
opportunism serves an important structural purpose where the evolution of
ex ante legal rules is concerned, and contend that while equity-oriented
moral reasoning might serve to inform the character and construction of
such rules, the use of equity as an ex post remedy should generally be
rejected by judicial decision makers.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the unavoidable limitations of the human moral imagination,
moral norms will not always align with the structures established by law.
This understanding, recognized from Aristotle and other ancients onward,1
has undergirded much of the debate regarding the proper mechanisms for
bridging the chasm between the order established by law and the order
required by morality.
The concept of equity—described by some commentators as secondorder law—was, at common law, one instrument used to further this
bridging process. 2 Equity sought to prescribe distinct remedies whose
character was contingent upon the context of the proceeding at hand,
whereas law (strictly understood) was bound to a more formalistic
understanding rooted in rule sets established ex ante.3
Over time, the development of legal culture resulted in a fusion of
courts of law and courts of equity, in which law-court judges were
empowered to dispense equitable remedies.4 The seminal (and perpetually
controversial) case of Riggs v. Palmer,5 which involved a murderer’s unjust
enrichment and ultimately turned on the general equitable principle that a
wrongdoer must not profit from his wrongdoing, exists within this tradition,
and the dilemma it poses underlies much of the analysis to follow.6
The workability of equity is often challenged due to its affirmation
of ex post remedies (in lieu of reliance on ex ante frameworks).7 Equity’s
critics argue that equity allows individual judicial discretion to take the
place of law,8 which destabilizes reliance interests and renders the legal
landscape indeterminate. However, some scholars have defended the use of

1

See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 100 (Roger Crisp trans., 2000) (“[W]hat is
equitable . . . is nevertheless just, and it is not by being a different genus that it is superior
to justice. The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while both are good, what is
equitable is superior.”).
2
See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 1
(Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2617413&download=yes [hereinafter Smith, Equity].
3
See id. at 1–2.
4
See id. at 2.
5
22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
6
Id. at 190.
7
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 6.
8
See id. at 20.
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equity, and even argued for its expansion in cases where the dictates of
legal and moral imperatives appear to diverge.9
This Article critiques the general case for a revived conception of ex
post equity, articulated most thoroughly in Professor Henry Smith’s An
Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity,10 and argues for an alternative
understanding of opportunism that recognizes the distinct varieties of
opportunistic behavior. Specifically, this Article challenges the overarching
characterization that the presence of opportunism in private law warrants
this revival of ex post equity doctrines. Leading private-law scholars, most
notably Professor Smith, have advocated for the broader use of ex post
equity by judges as a needed “safety valve”11 where traditional laws offer
purportedly inadequate remedies. The primary situation in which these
remedies are likely to prove inadequate, according to equity’s advocates, is
one in which agents have behaved opportunistically.12
In contrast, this Article argues that opportunism serves a necessary
purpose where the evolution of ex ante legal rules is concerned, and
contends that, while the general moral goals underlying equity might serve
to inform the character and construction of such rules, the general
movement away from equitable decision-making as a judicial remedy
should continue—even where opportunistic conduct is discernibly
problematic. In short, this Article offers a tailored critique of the counteropportunistic case for broader invocation of equity principles alongside a
defense of the utilitarian, gap-filling function performed by actors behaving
opportunistically.
Part II offers an exploration of opportunism as a concept, engaging
with the definitions offered by Professor Smith and other scholars. This
Article argues that opportunism, defined in such a way as to render it
conceptually meaningful, may be described as amoral, but need not be
understood as universally immoral. The descriptor immoral may, however,
be rationally attached to a particular variety of opportunism that bears
certain conceptual characteristics, which I term cognizably malignant
9

See id.
Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (Oct. 22, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVers
usEquity7.pdf [hereinafter Smith, Economic Analysis].
11
See id. at 4–5.
12
See id.
10
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opportunism (CMO). In outlining this idea of CMO, this Article suggests
that opportunism is generally a useful descriptor. It serves as convenient
shorthand for conduct occurring within the interstices of law, but does not
violate the law per se: its problematic connotations, however, are best
understood by viewing CMO as a distinct subtype of this phenomenon.
Part III both engages with the counter-opportunistic case for equity
and offers an alternative portrait of the development of legal rules. This
Article suggests that ex ante structures of law should be understood by
means of an evolutionary paradigm, and that this paradigm works against
the idea of supplementation via equity jurisprudence. It also considers how
an understanding of opportunism that affirms its innate utility (coupled with
a recognition that certain forms of opportunism are more pernicious than
others) can lead to entrenchment of efficient rules over time, which are
grounded in generally accepted social norms. This recognition is epitomized
within the doctrine of strict liability in Tort Law.
The Conclusion briefly examines additional normative questions
regarding the morality of opportunism and the role law should play in
addressing any legal-moral disjunction. This Article ends with a proposed
trajectory for equity jurisprudence recognizing both historical developments
and future avenues for growth. It ultimately argues that the moral purposes
underlying equity—and the formulation thereof advanced by its
contemporary defenders—may be achieved by structuring ex ante rules in
such a way as to progressively reduce the incidence of “immoral
opportunism.” This solution offers the best balance between encouraging
structural reliance, fostering legal evolution, and counteracting discernibly
problematic practices.
The stakes in this ostensibly theoretical debate are high. By
systemically expanding the breadth of judicial discretion, the push for
greater use of equitable remedies introduces a new, strong disincentive
against entering into legal obligations. Moreover, the resulting decisions fail
to generate any momentum toward reforming defective laws, since weakly
written texts can be “fixed” ex post by individual judges. In light of this, the
advantages of rebutting CMO via safety-valve equity do not outweigh the
consequences. Ex ante laws, created and modified via democratic processes,
remain preferable. Similarly, opportunism—understood in a suitably broad
sense—may serve a neutral, or even benign, purpose.
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I. OPPORTUNISM AS CONCEPT
Prior to weighing its relationship to law and equity, opportunism
must be conceptually defined, and that definition must be justified. This
task requires close consideration of embedded assumptions regarding the
morality of conduct occurring in the shadow of legal rules and conduct
occurring by means of such rules.13 This Part begins by first considering the
general characterization of “opportunism” that Professor Smith advances,14
and subsequently offering a broader construction of the term. This Part then
considers the question of guilefulness in opportunism, as raised by Professor
Oliver Williamson.15 These definitions of opportunism have provided the
theoretical baseline for increased advocacy of safety-valve equitable
remedies16: thus, scrutinizing them for internal coherence is vital. Having
weighed the definitions suggested by these professors and found them
wanting, this Part introduces a framework for conceptualizing CMO, which
addresses the thorny moral and epistemological questions posed by the
process of formulating a definition, and provides a workable baseline for
the analysis to follow.
A.

Identifying a General Concept of Opportunism

Professor Smith offers a definition of opportunism that warrants
considered analysis: “Opportunism . . . often consists of behavior that is
technically legal but is done with a view to securing unintended benefits
from the system, and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs they
impose on others.”17 This definition serves as the foundation of Professor
Smith’s argument in favor of ex post equity.18
An example serves to illustrate this: A enters into a contract with B,
whom A knows to be gullible, and structures the terms such that A
disproportionately reaps the benefits of the contract. B suffers from a lack of
foresight but is legally capable of consenting to the agreement. B’s financial
imprudence ultimately costs him his business, though the net economic
returns to A are ultimately marginal.
13

See id. at 4.
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2.
15
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
16
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2.
17
Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9–10.
18
See generally id.
14
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Professor Smith’s definition of opportunism, however, contains two
problematic assumptions: first, it assumes that there is a singular, clear,
ascertainable intent of the system and second, it rests on an indeterminate
standard of net benefits as its moral benchmark.19 Each of these deficiencies
results in workability problems when opportunism is explored in light of the
equity question.
First, the problem of discerning and articulating the collective intent
of a decision-making body has been discussed at great length.20 In the
example above, the law’s failure to shield B from A’s conduct may be
explainable as either an incentive for individuals to engage in their own
cost-benefit analysis prior to contracting, 21 or as a means by which
lawmakers anticipate entrenching their self-interested plans at some future
point. The fact that the law does not protect A sheds no light on the
underlying past intent of those who left this lacuna in place. For purposes of
this analysis, it suffices to note that intent cannot necessarily serve as a
useful external referent.
Second, this characterization assumes that furtherance of net social
benefits is the threshold standard for morality of conduct.22 It is additionally
unclear whether these benefits are to be understood in purely economic
terms—to what extent are system norms such as “due process,” 23 for
instance, quantifiable—and if not, how such benefits and costs can be
rationally treated as commensurable. If gullible B is a historically
incompetent manager, for instance, are B’s economic resources better put to
use after they pass into A’s hands? B’s conduct may be reasonably
described as immoral or undesirable by reference to a deontological ethic of
reciprocity,24 but it is not clear that this ethic should be employed as a more
19

See id. at 9–10.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863,
869–72 (1930).
21
See generally Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost Benefit Analysis? A Question
(and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135 (2008) (discussing
the use of individual cost-benefit analysis).
22
See generally Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10.
23
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24
See generally Deontological Ethics, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britan
nica.com/topic/deontological-ethics (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (describing ethical theories
that place emphasis on the relationship between duty and the morality of human actions).
20
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general criterion of net social benefit (and Professor Smith’s definition does
not endeavor to establish this).
Due to these inherent difficulties with Professor Smith’s definition, I
propose an alternative general definition of opportunism: opportunism is
self-interested behavior that is legal but unanticipated. This definition
encompasses three key ideas:
1)

Behavior that is not self-interested would not inspire the loopholeexploiting controversy on which this entire debate rests.
Opportunism, by definition, is self-interested.
Opportunism is not illegal. Illegal or fraudulent behavior is an
express violation of ex ante rules, whereas, by definition, loopholes
are matters to which the law does not explicitly speak either to
sanction or to forbid.
Unanticipated behavior is not equivalent to unintended behavior.
The language of unanticipated behavior recognizes that opportunism
arises out of unforeseen possibilities as evidenced by the bare fact
that the behavior itself may fall within the letter, if not the spirit, of
the law. Whereas the language of unintended behavior presumes that
a readily comprehensible intent exists against which opportunistic
behavior can be weighed.

2)

3)

Professor Smith’s general case for equity emerges from his
attribution of certain properties to the phenomenon of opportunism25:
I suggest that opportunism is behavior that is undesirable but
that cannot be cost-effectively captured—defined, detected,
and deterred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking. Opportunism
is residual behavior that would be contracted away if ex ante
transaction costs were lower. Not coincidentally, it often
violates moral norms, which are incorporated into the ex post
principles that deal with opportunism.26
25

While many of the problematic features of opportunism Professor Smith identifies
are analogous to the phenomenon of cognizably malignant opportunism (discussed infra),
this Article argues that the particular features of Professor Smith’s indictment of
opportunism do not result in a coherent construct (against which equitable remedies should
be used).
26
Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9.
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This definition of opportunism is rooted in the assumption that undesirable
behavior—behavior that exploits loopholes within ex ante legal
frameworks—cannot be captured cost-effectively; however, it also implies
that such behavior will never be captured cost-effectively.
Note the time window within which each assumption rests: the first
operates with a view to present conditions, while the second draws an
inference regarding the capacity of future legal rulemaking to adequately
address loopholes within the system. This second assumption fails to
consider that ex ante rules exist within a dynamic process of information
collection, reevaluation, and change. The operation of the legislative system
over time offers a framework for the slow advance of ex ante rule tailoring
to address loophole problems that may arise.
This idea of progressive rule tailoring is not merely an outgrowth of
the deliberative process: deliberations extensive enough to address all, or
even most, of the possible contingencies resulting from complex legislation
would likely impose excessively high transaction costs.27 Ex ante tailoring
need not be conceptualized as ex ante in the sense that solutions necessarily
emerge from a deliberative or legislative process, but from review of the
extant legal processes as they unfold through court systems on a regular
basis. The opportunist’s systematic exploitation of loopholes, if deemed
sufficiently undesirable by decision makers or their constituents, may be
curtailed via changes in the law.28
Yet the undesirability of a particular loophole-exploiting behavior—
a foundational component of Professor Smith’s definition—is understood as
undesirable only by virtue of its actualized effects. In order for its effects to
be properly identified, the behavior in question must occur, be deemed
undesirable, and be censured accordingly. This process is the pathway by
which private law, at least in its ex ante dimension, evolves.
Recognizing that ex ante laws are perpetually imperfect and
continually developing certainly does not suggest that, within a system of
increasingly tailored ex ante rules, interstices will no longer exist. Rather, it
correctly affirms that ex ante rules exist within an ongoing evolutionary
27

See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 262–
66 (2007) (for an expanded discussion of transaction costs within the legislative process).
28
See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading,
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1987) (discussing the decentralized economic gains reaped from
the informational asymmetries inherent to insider trading).
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process of change. Under this schema, generalized opportunism is not
necessarily something to be rooted out or tamed (a moral evil of sorts,
malum in se, comparable to deception or fraud), but is instead merely a
description of a phenomenon that will necessarily exist within any system
that endeavors to set out any ex ante rules. Strict liability in tort, as
discussed in Part III, offers one example of a way the ex ante tailoring
problem has been addressed: namely, the entrenchment of certain conduct
standards that allow for greater stakeholder reliance.
B.

The Question of Opportunism and Guile

It may be objected at this stage of the argument that the definition of
opportunism outlined here encompasses too broad a swath of conduct,
including conduct not socially disadvantageous. Opportunism, as used
colloquially, seems to suggest a cognizance of norm violation on the part of
the individual exploiting a loophole.29 Such an understanding is epitomized
in the formulation of opportunism advanced by Professor Williamson,
which parallels Professor Smith’s definition, by casting opportunism as
“self-interest seeking with guile.”30 This Article contends that a reluctance
to include a specific definitional requirement of guilefulness or chicanery
(comparable to the bad faith doctrines that may be invoked to impose
damages in the sphere of Contract Law) is conceptually defensible and
necessary to render the following discussions cogent.
First, it bears mentioning that Professor Smith’s definition of
opportunism—though itself not without difficulties, as noted above—moves
beyond Professor Williamson’s presumption of a guilefulness requirement.
While Professor Smith’s definition refers to “unintended benefits,”31 the
conception of intent by which he identifies opportunism is correlated with
the intent of the extant legal structure’s architects. It does not presuppose a
sort of economic mens rea that the opportunist must possess. In short,
guilefulness may be a property of an actor who behaves opportunistically,
or a descriptor of a discrete action taken, but neither Professor Smith’s
definition nor the definition proposed here include guilefulness, understood
on the level of a first-person perspective, as a requirement.

29

See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 4–5.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 15, at 30.
31
Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 10.
30
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A more fundamental problem sheds light on the reason for this
conceptual cabining. The argument that opportunism entails a certain
cognizance of norm violation32 encounters an epistemic difficulty: for this
cognizance to occur, the actor must be aware of the intent of the rule-maker
at the time the action in question (the action later termed “opportunistic”)
transpires. This motive-driven inquiry goes well beyond the scope of a
typical mens rea analysis.33 For a finding of opportunism to hold, it requires
establishing not simply intent to do something, but the intent to do
something with awareness that the formulator of the system’s rules did not
intend to permit such conduct. This is a very high conceptual bar, and one
that renders it generally impracticable to use the term opportunism in the
sense deployed by Professor Smith. After all, how can one feel confident
terming any particular form of conduct opportunistic when satisfying a
second-order intent-to-commit-normative-violation prerequisite may prove
elusive? An alternate characterization of opportunism—one that renders the
term a persistently meaningful descriptor at the ex post level—is warranted.
In short, the effort to incorporate an intent-to-commit-normativeviolation requirement into the definition of opportunism entails two
problematic assumptions: first, an actor’s capability to consistently discern
the underlying intent of a rule-maker and second, an ability to establish, via
external or third-person observation, that an actor had such a capability and,
yet, did not exercise it.34 By contrast, a definition turning on unanticipated
consequences establishes a broader, yet more epistemologically articulable,
understanding of opportunism, which can bind the inquiry moving forward.
Last, the problem of social costs must be considered. The question is
whether an adverse imbalance between costs incurred and benefits accrued
is a necessary component of a definition of opportunism. As suggested
above, this immediately encounters a problem of indeterminacy. Decisions
regarding the number and character of the stakeholders involved, which
form the background against which such a cost-benefit analysis is situated,
appear to stem from ultimately arbitrary judgments. For example, is A’s
32

See id.
See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–06 (1994) (common law
rule of typical mens rea requirement).
34
Additional normative questions may also be raised at this stage: for instance, how a
rule-maker’s expressed or unexpressed intent translates into the imposition of a moral
obligation, and to what extent an actor several degrees removed from the rule-maker may
be compelled to adhere to such an obligation.
33

2016

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

73

conduct to be judged (via cost-benefit analysis) solely with respect to B’s
interests, or should A’s conduct be assessed with respect to the particular
industry as a whole? Or, thinking more broadly, is the entire landscape of
the national or global economy the appropriate forum for judging the costs
and benefits of A’s action? Thus, definitions of opportunism that hinge on
this cost-benefit disparity are ultimately problematic: they rest on nonstandardized, embedded assumptions regarding how, and with respect to
whom, cost-benefit analyses of economic conduct should be handled. The
generalized definition proposed here avoids this particular theoretical
pitfall.35
C.

Cognizably Malignant Opportunism

The preceding Part has offered a much broader definition of
opportunism than those offered by Professors Smith and Williamson. The
definition proposed above, however, seems to neglect the fact that a certain
subset of opportunistic behavior still remains intuitively problematic. Some
sort of substantive difference exists between seeing a unique opportunity,
which has arisen under the law and no one else has yet identified, and
obvious exploitation of the rule to one’s advantage. An additional ingredient
appears present in the latter formulation, though the precise character of that
ingredient may be challenging to ascertain.
Within the large umbrella of opportunism, as broadly defined above,
discrete instances of the type of morally dubious conduct of which
Professors Smith and Williamson speak are certainly present. This Article
has challenged the components of their respective definitions, but as yet
identified, no standard against which certain particularly pernicious forms
of opportunistic conduct (heretofore described as “immoral”) may be
challenged.
This Article accordingly proposes the following framework, loosely
derived from the Kantian categorical imperative, 36 to break the
35

None of this definitional inquiry should be read as a defense, on moral grounds, of
individual actors’ rationales that may lie behind opportunistic practice (as defined here).
Nor should this discussion be considered a per se indictment of the moral ends sought by
the use of equitable remedies as counter-opportunistic measures. Indeed, certain forms of
opportunism (as discussed infra) can still be subjected to challenge on moral grounds,
though equitable remedies may be an ultimately unsuitable countermeasure.
36
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(Allen W. Wood ed., Yale University Press 1785).
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aforementioned impasse between intuitive moral awareness and epistemic
indeterminacy. The specific types of undesirable conduct challenged by
Professors Smith and Williamson fall within the category of CMO. In this
Article, I have defined CMO as follows: the use of a given legal rule to act
in such a way that if all actors were to do likewise, the anticipated effect of
the rule would be wholly frustrated.
This formulation, existing within the broader bounds of the more
amorphous opportunism category previously outlined, sets up a four-part
requirement for deeming conduct an instance of CMO.
Use of Legal Rule: A particular rule, or meaningfully interrelated set
of rules, must exist where a charge of CMO may be leveled, i.e., there is a
meaningful difference between a generally wrongful act and an occurrence
of CMO. Additionally, CMO entails an affirmative act of engaging in a
particular type of conduct—one does not accidentally manifest CMO. Using
a rule suggests a discernible orientation of an actor’s behavior toward rule
manipulation.
All Actors: This prong of the test requires an adjudicator to weigh
the conduct of a given actor by means of a large-scale assessment. What
would be the wide effect of a challenged behavior if all parties bound by the
rule in question engaged in such behavior? Since individualized instances of
conduct may be impacted by hard-to-assess contextual factors, this prong
entails a more meta-level inference about the broad effects of a behavior
that has hypothetically become commonplace.
Anticipated Effect of the Rule: This is the key prong of the test; and
is necessary to differentiate between the broad category of arguably amoral
opportunism previously discussed and the far more problematic CMO.
Unanticipated conduct—all types of behavior arising under a given rule—is
not identical to anti-anticipated conduct—the forms of unanticipated
conduct that bear an actual relationship to the conduct norms outlined in the
rule itself or its prefatory matter. To establish a finding of CMO, there must
be a connection between the anticipation of the rule-makers and the active
thwarting of this specific anticipation by the bad actor engaging in CMO.
Note that this Article deliberately avoids using the language of intent due to
its subjective overtones (as discussed above), whereas anticipated effects
(invoked here) are more easily discernible from the text and legislative
history that underpin a given rule.
Wholly Frustrated: Presuming that the rules governing a specific
domain of behavior have been formed through a morally legitimate process
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(hypothetically speaking, via democratic voting in a liberal society), moral
and social harm likely result from a mass strategic circumvention, by selfinterested actors, of legitimate rules. In an instance of CMO, a rule is
thwarted to achieve not just a self-interested end, but a rule-oppositional
end. In short, the rule itself is not conceptually reconcilable with CMO
arising thereunder.
Consider the example of Riggs v. Palmer, 37 discussed at length
throughout Professor Smith’s analysis. Riggs featured an example 38 of
CMO in action: if all actors killed people to prevent them from changing
their wills, the anticipated effect of having a will in the first place (the
expression and instantiation of one’s wishes regarding postmortem disposal
of assets) would be wholly frustrated.
In contrast to the problems developing from CMO, benign or
inconsequential (non-CMO) opportunism is an incidental and necessary
effect of lawmaking; it is not a behavior perceptibly directed toward the
actual frustration of the rule itself (an action whose anti-normative intent
may potentially be inferred from conduct, but an action the invalidity of
which is not contingent on such an inference). For instance, let us suppose
that loopholes in the structure of a recently passed international financial
regulation provision allow a clever-minded financier to take advantage of a
newly created arbitrage opportunity. The financial regulation provision in
question has no anticipated effect on arbitrage practices, but an opportunity
has arisen nonetheless. This is a species of opportunism within the
definition sketched above, but it is not a form of CMO. Even if everyone
engaged in the practice in question, the purpose of the tax provision itself
would not be thwarted. The presence of some unanticipated effects may be
desirable as a means of identifying areas where the law may need to, or can,
develop; however, contradictory effects are almost certainly undesirable.
Both definitions of opportunism introduced by Professors Smith and
Williamson, as discussed above, encounter difficulties due to their reliance
on attributions of bad intent to a particular actor (the imputation of which
may be difficult when done at an ex post interval). Conversely, conduct
allegedly falling under the category of CMO can be weighed more
objectively against the rule itself, by weighing the projected effects of a
37
38

22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
Id. at 190.
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broad adoption of the challenged behavior against the anticipated results of
the rule itself (hence the “cognizably” descriptor). An additional example
may shed light on this distinction between manifestations of opportunism.
Consider the example of a company, such as Uber or Lyft, which provides
many of the services associated with taxi companies but is not bound by
many of the same regulations.39 This company shall be called “Malevolent
Motors.” Malevolent Motors, like both Uber 40 and Lyft, 41 employs
background checks and vehicle inspections in conducting its operations
(even though Malevolent Motors is not required to do so explicitly by
law).42 Malevolent Motors operates within the interstices of existing ex ante
rules, in that its conduct is self-interested and legal, but was likely
unanticipated by rule crafters.
Suppose that Malevolent Motors is so successful that it ultimately
drives out the taxi industry entirely and becomes the sole provider of driverfor-hire services in its market. Suppose further that upon attaining
marketplace dominance, Malevolent Motors suspends its voluntary practice
of requiring background checks and vehicle inspections and allows anyone
to serve as drivers.
In such a scenario, the rules binding taxi services, but not
Malevolent Motors, have been themselves used in such a way as to wholly
frustrate their anticipated effect (where the anticipated effect is enhanced
vetting of drivers-for-hire).43 This latter is an instance of CMO, whereas the
former case (Malevolent Motors’ operation alongside established taxi
outfits, despite the fact that Malevolent Motors exists within a legal
loophole) exemplifies more generalized opportunism.
Given that a distinction exists between opportunism as a broad
category and CMO in particular, one might contend that equity judgments
39

Sam Frizell, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Taxi Regulations Are There for a
Reason, TIME (Nov. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history.
40
Details on Safety, UBER (July 15, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/details-onsafety/.
41
We Go the Extra Mile For Safety, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/safety (last visited
Jan. 30, 2016).
42
See generally Mike Isaac, Technology: Uber’s System for Screening Drivers Draws
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/technology/uber
s-system-for-screening-drivers-comes-under-scrutiny.html?_r=0 (discussing Uber’s and
Lyft’s controversial background check policies).
43
In other words, Malevolent Motors would not have been able, “but for” the existence
of these rules, to engage in the conduct it did.
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are uniquely suited to redress injuries resulting from CMO. A broad revival
of equitable remedies as an anti-CMO counter, however, risks applying a
sledgehammer where a tack hammer is more appropriate. As subsequent
Parts will argue, the potential harms of failing to remediate specific
instances of CMO are outweighed by the potential structural harms of
deploying remedies untethered to ex ante rules or precedents. Later, the
Conclusion contends that equity is best understood as an ongoing moral
value (informing, in a normative sense, how ex ante rules are shaped by
lawmakers) rather than as a remedial instrument for use by adjudicators.
II. OPPORTUNISM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY CASE AGAINST EQUITY
This Part argues that opportunism, understood in its generalized
sense, serves an indispensable role in the evolution of law.44 There are two
normative reasons to prefer this view of opportunism to a view that
embraces increased use of equity and its maxims: reliance interests and
legal gap-filling. These two reasons, while distinct, are interlinked in
several ways.
A.

Reliance Interests

Reliance interests (the need for decision makers to rely on consistent
requirements, guidelines, and restrictions) 45 underpin the conventional
argument against equity. Ex ante legal norms must be predictable46 in order
for rational actors to continue engaging in the commerce of ordinary life;
arbitrariness in the administration of law works as a disincentive to action
of any sort. Accordingly, these norms, operating with a high degree of
continuity, are vital to ensure the flourishing of society.
Conversely, equity (operating in an ex post capacity) reserves
judgment of an action’s permissibility until that action has occurred and
been challenged on account of some allegedly overriding moral principle.
Such a standard may be justifiably accused of imprecision: Professor Smith

44

“Law” is understood as the formal, ex ante rule structures established by decision
makers, enforced by the state, and broadly accessible to individual actors.
45
See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (1994).
46
See generally id. (describing the problems of a scenario in which “neither private
parties nor Congress can rely on settled law. This . . . undermines both democratic values
and rule-of-law values.”).
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himself writes of “the chilling effect of ex post discretionary equity.”47 For
those responsible for weighing possible courses of action, law is
undoubtedly preferable to equity as an overarching scheme. The
permissibility of particular actions (or classes of action) is generally easier
to ascertain when laws are announced ex ante than when actions are
subjected to judicial reevaluation (and the granting of unpredictable
remedies) in light of relatively unfixed “equitable” standards.
Notably, the major structural advantages identified in the following
subsections are applicable to all forms of opportunism, including CMO.
Where CMO is concerned, counter-opportunistic tools (namely, the
modification of ex ante rules) exist, which need not open the door to the
unpredictability problems associated with equitable remedies.
B.

Legal Gap-Filling

Where recourse to ex post equity is sharply circumscribed or
curtailed entirely, changes in the law itself may be catalyzed. Opportunism
(broadly construed) functions as a sort of dye in the system of law that
identifies areas where unanticipated occurrences have arisen, which may
warrant intervention by those responsible for the crafting of law. For
instance, in some domains, (such as Tax Law) public sentiment may weigh
against gap-filling action where certain loopholes are concerned. This can
operate as a barrier to change. 48 It has no bearing, however, on the
identification of the loopholes that opportunism allows.
In short, acts falling within the general definition of opportunism
identify structural legal loopholes, which decision makers may choose to
close or ignore. Where such loopholes are left open, this inaction may be
understood, from the perspective of an individual actor making conduct
decisions in a system where equitable safety-valves are not in place,49 as de
facto permission to engage in the opportunistic practice. This is a factor
weighing against a broad characterization of opportunism as always being
undesirable. 50 Therefore, decision makers may wish to allow a certain
degree of risk and reward within the system. This does not, however, apply
47

Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 6.
See, e.g., Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2683 (2013).
49
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 6.
50
See id. at 10.
48
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to CMO—against which alternative, punitive sanctions may be leveled via a
process of ex ante rulemaking.
Reliance interests and evolutionary legal processes may not always
intersect perfectly. It bears mentioning that evolutionary developments in
the law do implicate the aforementioned reliance interests, and they may
potentially have a destabilizing effect on those invested in the processes
governed by such changing laws. Such a critique is fair. However, a more
nuanced understanding does not embrace a strict binary of equity as
destabilizing and law as stable. Rather, it acknowledges a continuum
between arbitrariness and predictability. An evolutionary understanding of
law hews closer to predictability than equity does for three reasons:
participation, deliberation, and accountability.
Under a system in which laws evolve to rebut opportunism (or do
not do so) as information increases, affected parties have the opportunity to
help shape, by means of engagement with the rule crafters, the ex ante
constraints to which they will eventually be subjected. In so doing, they
may blunt the effects of sharp changes in legal direction (a proposed abrupt
closing of long-existent loopholes might undergo an extension in the
timeline for mandatory compliance), promoting greater continuity between
pre-change and post-change states of the law. This participation in the
process by those affected is not present in a system where judges may,
unilaterally and without prior warning, dispense equitable remedies.
In allocating sufficient time for debate regarding possible
consequences of a given legal rule, lawmakers create a record of
deliberation to which subsequent actors can look when determining the realworld ramifications of said rule.51 The lack of an instant case or controversy
enables rule crafters to carefully structure their attempts to limit
opportunistic practices, diminishing the risk of entrenching bad policy via
precedent. The deliberative process also allows for greater fact-finding
regarding the nature and extent of loophole exploitation, rather than
subjecting such determinations of exploitation to judicial discretion alone.52
51

For example, legislative history keeps track of debates regarding laws. See Federal
Legislative History: Initial Steps, Lɪʙ. Cᴏɴɢʀᴇss, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/leghist.php
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
52
Additionally, questions regarding the admissibility, or lack thereof, of evidentiary
materials relevant to the loophole-exploitation question (as epitomized within a particular
case) may potentially exist within a judicial proceeding. Legislative drafters are not subject
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The standards of participation and deliberation are themselves
bolstered by the fact that legislative decision makers are (in most cases)
subject to the democratic process.53 This process produces incentives to
maintain the integrity of the legal evolutionary system. Those whose
conduct has been destabilized without sufficient justification can eventually
punish those responsible for arbitrary treatment or bad faith decisionmaking. Equity jurisprudence is not always subject to such institutional
constraints.
Once counter-opportunistic revisions in ex ante rules have been
formulated, implementation must occur. This implementation is assuredly
not costless; the costs of compliance with new ex ante rules, however, can
be offset by the aforementioned predictability advantages. Since statutory
texts generally have a cabining effect on the extent of courts’ equitable
discretion,54 comparatively greater stability follows from the evolutionary
model.
The evolutionary alternative to equity, outlined above, has operated
from a presumption that equity is both necessarily indeterminate and
problematically vague. Such a presumption has not gone unanticipated in
the work of equity’s advocates. Early on, Professor Smith offers a means of
cabining the vision of equity, he posits: “Injunctions, the quintessential
equitable remedy, act against named parties (and those acting in concert
with them) and can be very finely tailored, both in their specificity and their
breadth to the problem at hand.”55 This characterization, however, appears
incongruous with the rationale previously identified for broader deployment
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
to such institutional constraints, and thus (structurally speaking) have the capacity to work
with a greater range of informational resources.
53
See Democracy, Mᴇʀʀɪᴀᴍ-Wᴇʙsᴛᴇʀ, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/d
emocracy (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“A form of government in which people choose
leaders by voting.”).
54
Professor Plater explained:
Where the judge believes that a statute does not serve the public interest
in a particular case, he or she is of course free to say so, but must
nevertheless give the law its required effect. In such cases the practical
result of statutory enforcement, by injunction or otherwise, will often be
a transfer of the controversy to the legislature, which is the proper
repository of the power to promulgate statutory exemptions and
amendments.
See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV.
524, 528 (1982).
55
Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 23.
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of equity principles, given that the justification of equity based on grounds
of ex post fairness is the crux of equity’s legitimation by means of
opportunism. If opportunism is, as supporters of equity characterize it,
fundamentally immoral, it would appear necessary for equity to operate as a
broad counter to this moral violation (a violation not expected from an ex
ante perspective). The charge that such action risks a blunderbuss effect is
seemingly unavoidable. That outcome, which is immoral, must be rejected
broadly, irrespective of ex ante controlling principles.
In arguing that the advantages of increased use of equity outweigh
the structural costs imposed, Professor Smith contends that the use of equity
can be confined to a limited domain in order to preserve reliance interests as
much as possible.56
[T]he question is whether and when equity, with its chilling
effect, can be a more cost-effective response to S’s
opportunism than is the ex ante precaution (and the
alternative of no contract). . . . It makes sense for equity to
develop proxies for the opportunities for opportunism and
limit itself to this defined domain in order to diminish its
chilling effect on legitimate behavior.57
Drawing a parallel between ex post equitable remedies and ex ante rules
that incorporate the moral-philosophical goals behind equitable remedies
conflates equity as practice with equity as a normative value, the latter of
which may inform the legal deliberations of those who craft ex ante rules.58
The process of making law—as opposed to equity—is a process
characterized by the predictability advantages outlined above, thus leaning
in the direction of more reliable ex ante decision-making. For instance, the
proscription against contracting with minors, the mentally handicapped, or
intoxicated persons serves as an ex ante bar to a transaction. Conversely,
under a system incorporating safety-valve equity, a transaction with such
persons might occur and reliance interests might vest, but the transaction
could subsequently be invalidated ex post. Though this is a clear example of
56

See id. at 49.
Id.
58
For instance, those developing ex ante rules may choose to structure ruleresponsibility frameworks so as to mitigate inequalities in bargaining power—strict sets of
disclosure requirements, for instance, that allow parties to enter transactions with fuller
cognizance of the risks involved.
57
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immoral CMO as outlined in Part I, it shows how equity is structurally
problematic in a way that opportunism is not.
A hypothetical serves to illustrate this distinction: a statute exists
that only prevents contracting with individuals within the three categories
outlined above (underage/handicapped/inebriated). A contracts with B at a
time when B is emotionally unstable. A is provably cognizant of B’s
ongoing inner turmoil. Shortly after performance has begun, B challenges
the initial validity of the contract on the grounds that A inequitably
exploited B’s condition of emotional instability.
Per the definition of opportunism outlined in Part I, A behaved
opportunistically within the bounds of the existing law. A’s conduct was
self-interested, since A pursued A’s own interest in contracting knowing of
B’s emotional condition. A’s conduct was legal, as B was of the age of
majority, of sound mental health, and not intoxicated. Finally, A’s conduct
was (probably) unanticipated by B, if not by the drafters of the relevant
controlling statute. (This does not, however, require that A had been aware,
at the point of acting, that A’s conduct was so unanticipated.)
Further, suppose that the presiding judge rules that B is excused
from performance. Such a ruling would be consonant with the antiopportunistic (or alternatively, anti-CMO) aims articulated as justifications
for doing equity. However, to excuse B from performance (where the
conceptual grounds for the excusal are specified solely ex post), would have
substantial consequences: A, and those similarly situated, would be strongly
incentivized to undertake expensive investigations into the general welfare
and stability of potential contracting partners, in the hope of warding off
any attempts to assert lack of capacity and levy charges of opportunism. No
text-derived norm need limit the possible inequities an aggrieved claimant
might assert before an equity-minded judge. Transaction costs would
increase dramatically. Even then, A would lack any guarantee that A’s
efforts might satisfy ex post scrutiny by equity-minded judges.
An alternative does exist: the law rendering certain types of
contracts voidable might be expanded through the legislative process to
include contracts produced under conditions in which one party is
displaying acute emotional instability, with enough evidence that potential
contracting partners might be expected to reasonably apprehend its
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presence. If this particular language is unpalatable, then the relevant
stakeholders might progressively make revisions.59
Suppose that the language provided is adopted into the governing
statute. A’s opportunism (a clear instance of CMO: if all parties did
likewise, the anticipated effect of having anti-incapacity safeguards in
Contract Law would be thwarted) has triggered an evolution in the law, the
need for which might have been obviated by the use of equity. Additionally,
this evolution shapes the ex ante landscape that decision makers can
consider prior to contracting, reducing the degree of guesswork necessitated
by an equity-heavy system.
A further example serves to bolster this point. Professor Smith’s
case for equity discusses at length the problem of unintentional property
encroachments as a justification for ex post equity. 60 Here, the strict
application of the law may result in socially disadvantageous results, such
as the demolition of unintentionally encroaching structures; ergo, judges
should apply equity principles to avoid such an outcome.61
The claim that this scenario requires resorting to equity makes two
assumptions: it assumes that inter-party bargaining (an optimal scenario, as
it entirely sidesteps the transaction costs incurred through employing the
judicial process) is not possible or has failed,62 and it assumes that the laws
governing encroachment are likely to be static. This second assumption
touches on the crux of the evolutionary case against equity: if strict
application of the law leads to persistently irrational and undesirable results,
pathways for changing the substance of that law do exist.63 The existence of
59

See discussion infra Part III for a consideration of how the “reasonableness”
standard intersects with ex ante versus ex post considerations in the context of reliance
interests.
60
See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 14.
61
It bears mention that “unintentional property encroachment” is not an example of
CMO: the rules of property law are not affirmatively being used to act in a particular
manner. Accordingly, this particular phenomenon does not seem germane to the problem of
CMO that Professor Smith indicts.
62
The Coase Theorem highlights the latent problems in this first assumption. See, e.g.,
Coltman v. Comm’r, 980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992) (“So long as the rule of law is
known when parties act, the ultimate economic result is the same no matter which way the
law has resolved the issue.”).
63
See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1990) (“After all, another way to avoid an
undesirable result from the application of a general rule of law is to change the general rule
of law.”).
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opportunistic practices within a system can serve to highlight the need to
make those legal changes. Additionally, it bears mentioning that such use of
equity is likely to increase transaction costs in the long run; if problematic
laws themselves remain unchanged and repeated recourse to the judicial
process is required.64
C.

The Problem of Persistent Rule Exploitation

At this point, one might contend that legal evolution (namely,
counter-opportunistic rule reformulation) is always, to some degree, a form
of “kicking the can down the road.” 65 After all, the possibilities for
exploiting modified ex ante rules are not necessarily foreclosed by the mere
act of modification. The question is whether the dedicated CMO perpetrator
will simply keep revising the method by which he steps outside anticipations
of the rule-makers.
The answer to the question of whether the possibilities for
exploitation, even after ex ante adjustment, via CMO still remain great is
necessarily indeterminate and circumstantial. Moreover, inquiry along these
lines is subject to multiple intervening variables likely to stymie a systemic
empirical investigation. As such, the direct answer to this objection depends
on factors beyond the scope of the theoretical analysis offered here.
Such an objection, however, entails a presupposition that the only
relevant quality of the legal evolutionary process is its ability to directly
stop opportunistic66 (or more narrowly, CMO) conduct—this is not the case.
Professor Rebecca Stone, describing the phenomenology of norm
compliance, describes “internalizers” as those whose preferences and values
(which in turn govern conduct) are shaped by the pedagogical effect of legal
structures:
[L]egal rules speak to subjects who adopt an “internal point
of view” towards the law—subjects who are willing to
bracket their immediate self-interest in order to conform with
64

See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61,
101–03 (2005) (arguing that transaction costs are a price worth paying in order to attain
equitable outcomes).
65
See generally Gʀᴀᴍᴍᴀʀɪsᴛ, http://grammarist.com/usage/kick-the-can-down-theroad/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“[Kick the can down the road] means to defer conclusive
action with a short-term solution.”).
66
See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 24.
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those rules . . . . [The internalizer] takes the law as having
made certain normative determinations about what he should
do at the second stage and he defers to those determinations
rather than figuring them out for himself.67
As legal structures change and adapt in attempts to thwart opportunistic
conduct, the moral senses of internalizers may be calibrated in a way that
more accurately reflects the intent and dictates of the law. Such law—a
reflection of both the popular will as expressed through the democratic
process, and presumptively of the rule-maker’s own intent—is honed by
way of anti-opportunistic adjustment and clarification. As the law improves,
the tendency of internalizers68 to comply grows stronger; this advance exists
whether or not the new ex ante rules are successful with respect to
opportunistic conduct itself. Equitable principles, by contrast, are less likely
to have this effect, due to the lack of tailoring inherent in the equitable
maxims and their contextually contingent nature. 69 Such a lack of
consistency cuts against the characterization of equitable remedies as a
norm within the purview of Professor Smith’s analysis: a species of remedy
that works in unpredictable ways cannot meaningfully be described as a
norm.70
This assessment of net benefits does not necessitate a belief that all,
or even most, individuals are internalizers according to Professor Stone.71
There may well be large swaths of society (presumptively including the
genuinely determined opportunists) who fall within Justice Holmes’s
famous definition of “bad men,” not driven by values, but whose
compliance with norms is inseparably intertwined with a desire to avoid
sanctions for noncompliance.72 If even some members of society, however,
are not bad men, but rather internalizers, the process of legal evolution has a
67

Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point of View
4–5 (Aug. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=2134463.
68
Id.
69
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 40.
70
See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 9.
71
See generally Stone, supra note 67.
72
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997)
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict . . .
.”).
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beneficial effect; namely, it triggers the greater compliance of internalizers
with the broad set of civic values underlying the actual text of the law,
which are more clearly expressed via evolved ex ante rules.73
These kinds of benefits extend further still: the advantages of ex ante
rulemaking unfold not only on the landscape of meta-norms, but also in the
realm of pragmatic legal effects. Ex ante rules, properly designed, are
structured in such a way that generates additional positive system
externalities.74 Specifically, ex ante regimes legitimize punitive sanctions
for wrongful conduct, the presence of which attaches a potentially stronger
deterrent effect to immoral rule-breaking (or, as spelled out above, CMO)
than may be achieved under a system of equitable remedies—including
disgorgement.
As a matter of practice, the focus of the equitable remedy is
inevitably the wronged party, not the wrongdoer. 75 Given that such
remedies operate ex post, the principle against ex post facto laws76 bars the
possibility of certain punitive sanctions for undesirable conduct (where such
punitive sanctions go above and beyond the disgorgement of gains reaped
unlawfully or profits derived from such gains).77 Not only does the law
itself not develop to enhance reliance and clarify the lawmaker’s norms
(while at the same time cultivating positive pedagogical effects for Stone’s
internalizers),78 the safety-valve use of equity contains an inherently weaker
affirmative disincentive.79 The worst outcome faced by a determined bad
man, under the safety-valve formulation, is a series of failed attempts at rule
exploitation, for which civil remedial penalties (conceptually tied to gains
reaped) may be levied by equity-minded judges.80 Over time, these risks
may be calibrated and eventually rolled into the cost of business.
73

See Stone, supra note 67.
Frank Partnoy, The Timing and Source of Regulation, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 423,
426 (2014) (noting that ex ante rules are potentially subject to externalities).
75
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 11.
76
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
77
See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 5 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/11/the-equity-facade-of-sec-disgorgement/
(“It is also generally acknowledged that disgorgement cannot be used punitively, and thus
must be limited to an amount causally connected to the alleged wrongdoing.”).
78
Stone, supra note 67.
79
See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 4.
80
Holmes, supra note 72, at 995 (considering the scenario “in which equity will grant
an injunction, and will enforce it by putting the [bad man] in prison or otherwise punishing
him unless he complies with the order of the court”).
74
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Accordingly, expanding the use of equitable remedies strikes a less decisive
blow to the immoral (CMO) conduct that an equity-minded judge seeks to
prevent.81
Ex ante rules, by contrast, offer a more conceptually legitimate
framework to which punitive, non-disgorgement sanctions can be attached
as conduct incentives.82 Even if a similar form of risk calibration develops
on the part of the immoral opportunist, ex ante rules allow for a connection
between specific rule violations and specific sanctions. 83 Stronger
disincentives against rule violation exist in a system without equitable
safety valves—such valves may ameliorate harm to the one exploited, yet
fail to sting the exploiter. Where net social costs are concerned, this
enhanced disincentive effect encompasses the remedial advantages
envisioned in a safety-valve model84 while also allowing for a maximally
deterrent stick.85
To illustrate this, reconsider the example of A and B above. 86
Suppose that the legal regime put in place—treating contracts as void in
which one party suffers from emotional instability, as evidenced such that
potential contracting partners might be expected to reasonably apprehend its
presence—is supplemented by an additional prong. This prong notes that
violations of this section create a cause of action by which the aggrieved
party may recover punitive damages.87 A now not only knows exactly what
is expected of A, but has an additional incentive to comply. This strongform incentive would likely not be leveled ex post without violating the
presumption against ex post facto laws88: its utility as a stronger-than81

See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 10, at 30.
See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 86 (1983) (citing United Mine Workers v.
Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 749 (4th Cir. 1954)) (“Where Congress has intended [to create a right
to punitive damages] it has found no difficulty in using language appropriate to that end.”).
83
See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 11.
84
See id. at 59.
85
See generally Gʀᴀᴍᴍᴀʀɪsᴛ, http://grammarist.com/style/carrot-and-stick/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“[In order to motivate a person] either you strike [him] with a stick
or you urge [him] along with a carrot.”).
86
See discussion supra pp. 20–21.
87
No claim is made here as to the economic or social prudence of an actual rule of this
sort: the parameters of the scenario outlined here might have an overly disincentive effect
or otherwise cause transaction costs to spike. It is here introduced solely to illustrate the
powerful incentive-generating effect of ex ante rules—an effect that may exist to a lesser
degree in a safety-valve formulation relying on equitable remedies.
88
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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disgorgement remedy hinges on ex ante rulemaking. Accordingly, where
opportunism is accompanied by serious social costs, favoring an ex ante
strategy creates the best means of disincentivizing such grasping (i.e.,
CMO) conduct: while the definition of opportunism outlined above does not
incorporate a finding that social costs must outweigh benefits for conduct to
be deemed opportunistic, where such a negative dynamic exists, the model
proposed here offers a better framework for instituting structural
countermeasures. Equity jurisprudence cannot realistically replicate this
same maximally deterrent effect.89
It may be argued at this stage that the imposition of punitive
sanctions (other than the more conceptually limited disgorgement) suffers
from the same uncertainty problems heretofore attributed to the use of ex
post equity. 90 “Determining punishment by the gain attributable to a
wrong” 91 seems to intuitively possess predictability advantages over
punitive sanctions whose calculation is derived independently of the actual
instance of malfeasance.
This question is properly addressed at the preceding level. The
question is whether such a remedy will be used, rather than the precise
character of the remedial sums awarded. The possibility of using such a
remedy should be expressed as a property of the ex ante rules that govern
the conduct in question.92 Under a system embracing such a rule, engaging
in CMO renders it likely that prescribed consequences will result, and that
such consequences possess the capacity to reach high levels. A
disgorgement remedy might fulfill this same role—but the possibility of its
use as a CMO countermeasure should be bound into the ex ante rule whose
violation initially triggers legal proceedings. 93 Where deterrence is
concerned, the possibility that punitive non-disgorgement sanctions may
possibly exceed the costs of disgorgement creates a deterrent effect beyond
what is achieved by a system using disgorgement alone.
In summary, then, while CMO is conceptually distinguishable from
general strategic conduct (opportunism in the broad sense) its existence
89

See Smith, Equity, supra note 2, at 59.
See id. at 4–5.
91
Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 830 (2012).
92
See Jim Rossi, Beyond Goldwasser: Ex Post Judicial Enforcement in Deregulated
Markets, 2003 Mɪᴄʜ. Sᴛ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 717, 717 (2005) (“Ex ante rules provide forward-looking,
predictable and clear standards . . . .”).
93
See Gergen, supra note 91, at 830.
90
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does not create a justification for the countermeasures prescribed by
equity’s advocates,94 for the following reasons:
1)

Reliance interests are undermined across-the-board where the
potential for strong ex post equitable remedies is in place. While this
Article has argued above that it is rational to speak of CMO as a
distinct and bounded phenomenon, judges may disagree
(particularly given the likely dearth of relevant precedent) about
whether a given occurrence falls within this category. Accordingly,
a system using counter-opportunistic ex post remedies proposed is
inherently less predictable and disincentivizes actors’ reliance.
Under a system reviving the use of equity, ex ante rules lose the
impetus toward change or reform that opportunism (both in its
general and CMO varieties) produces. This, in turn, compromises
any pedagogical value that such changes have on norm internalizers
endeavoring to comply with the system’s rules of conduct.
Tying possible ex post remedies to the specific misdeeds committed
(i.e., disgorgement or restitution) results in a lack of access to
maximally deterrent penalties that might be attached to ex ante
rules. 95 Where disincentivizing CMO is the primary objective,
stronger penalties (within a framework that best allows for
predictable decision-making) are preferable.

2)

3)

Part III, moving beyond the question of opportunism to explore
further pragmatic alternatives to the deployment of equity, will consider
additional ways in which equitable objectives are instantiated in ex ante
laws, primarily through considering the role of strict-liability torts as
counterweights to opportunistic behavior.
III. COUNTER-OPPORTUNISM AND NORMATIVE ENTRENCHMENT
This Part suggests that strict-liability torts constitute one example of
a legal entrenchment of certain counter-opportunistic norms and, thereby,
reflect an aspirational, though not adjudicatory, understanding of equity.96
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Much debate has raged over whether torts constitute economic or
moral harms,97 and how law should be constructed to mitigate or punish
such harms. Without directly weighing into this debate, this Part suggests a
complementary perspective on Tort Law. From a historical standpoint, Tort
Law serves a signaling function. It offers a way for the values of a society,
at a given moment in time, to be instantiated in law; it provides a snapshot
of incentives and disincentives collectively expressed by the popular will.
Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the case of strict-liability
torts. After extensive experience, society determined that, in particular
contexts, certain aspects of opportunistic behavior are socially undesirable
(identified above as CMO). In an evolutionary paradigm such as the one
sketched here, strict-liability torts are an advanced form of counteropportunist measures that are legally codified (encompassing such
comparatively narrow categories as design defect and manufacturing defect,
among others) after standards of proper conduct have become thoroughly
entrenched in society. Where conduct norms based on social consensus are
less clear, or are likely to remain persistently unclear, fault-based,
negligence standards exist. Importantly, this observation does not require
that a specific position be taken on whether negligent actions constitute
moral failures (crossing the line into CMO). Rather, it simply relies upon a
generalized cultural idea of reasonableness that may be said to exist—the
bounds of which are inexact, but the presence of which is not. Accordingly,
though it may not be possible to definitively entrench anti-opportunistic or
anti-CMO norms based on a standard of reasonableness, negligence-based
standards still constitute a form of ex ante checks on conduct (albeit more
vague than strict-liability standards). Moreover, the ostensibly opaque
standard of reasonableness becomes progressively clearer over time as
additional laws develop and relevant judicial precedent accretes.
The crucial takeaway from this analysis is that initial expectations
for product manufacturers are made clear (or, at the very least clearer) under
a system of unpredictable, equitable remedies based on judicial discretion.
Manufacturers can grasp the general contours of the standards to which they
will be subjected; these standards are uniquely linked to their particular
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See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
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industry and practice, and are not simply generalized maxims applied to
their conduct.
This evolutionary, counter-opportunistic way of viewing Tort Law
may also offer clues as to why the extant tort regime remains in place, in
lieu of an expanded social insurance system designed to ameliorate harm to
injured parties. The systematic evolution of Tort Law—understood as an
ongoing process of observation, information collection, and legal
reformation—encourages the historical development of specific, ex ante
conduct norms that decision makers (who set the bounds of actors’ legal
expectations) can consistently rely upon. If these norms are unclear, the
presence of social insurance may not sufficiently disincentivize antisocial
(CMO) conduct. From this viewpoint, Tort Law is not exclusively about
“punishing moral wrongdoing” or “making an injured party whole,” but on
a meta-level, about reducing conduct deemed socially undesirable98 (where
“undesirability” is not some fixed lodestar principle).
Strict-liability torts impose rigorous ex ante expectations on actors
whose conduct falls within the ambit of such torts. These rigorous
expectations, in turn, restrict the exercise of independent discretion on the
parts of judges. From the viewpoint of an actor deciding how to behave in a
context where rules of strict liability exist, these rules have a strongly antiopportunistic effect: specifically, they provide a substantial deterrent against
CMO.99
The codification of default rules in Contract Law serves a similar
function. Such rules are accessible prior to an actor’s decision to contract or
not contract and operate as an additional support for reliance interests in the
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See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (examining the advantages of strict liability vis-à-vis
negligence).
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The possibility that a manufacturer might obtain insurance and engage in certain
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insurance and strict liability are considered in the context of opportunism, both incurring
liability and paying out and not incurring liability are permissible non-CMO choices. An
occurrence of CMO in this context would entail an attempt to circumvent the
payout/insurance dynamic entirely. The purpose of a strict liability rule is to impose
damages if certain conduct results in harm: the correct binary is not between safety and
payout, but between safety or payout and neither safety nor payout.
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event that drafting deficiencies within the contract itself are identified.100
These default rules are not themselves static, but (like strict-liability torts)
they reflect the prevalent normative consensus regarding the contracting
process.
At this point, an important criticism might be raised against the
perspective outlined above. Both Tort and Contract Law are not strictly
rule-based systems: these domains of law contain both ex ante rules and ex
ante standards (e.g., “good faith and fair dealing”).101 Professor Arthur Leff,
for instance, has challenged the utility of these standards.102 “[W]hen the
question is presented as a decision as to the ‘unconscionability’ of a single
contractual provision, the vacuousness of the standard is apparent.” 103
Elsewhere, Leff calls into question the tendency of the Uniform
Commercial Code’s drafters to “increase the abstraction level of the
drafting and explaining language”104 in order to produce “an emotionally
satisfying incantation.”105
In view of Leff’s critique, where judicial rulings are based not on ex
ante rules, but on ex ante standards, the question is whether the
indeterminacy problem outlined above is simply more obscured. Or, put
another way, is judicial discretion regarding standards likely to be as
potentially unpredictable as it might be under a system overtly embracing
discrete principles of equity? Leff raises a particularly salient objection to
such standards.106 “When the key evaluative word, however, is a description
of the judge’s own state of mind [i.e., too expensive] rather than of the
situation which might be justified in producing such a state, the likelihood
that the court will even examine the relevant questions is severely
lessened.”107
100

See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
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There are two possible avenues for answering this dilemma. The
former weighs the relative utilities of ex ante and ex post standards, while
the latter addresses the intrinsic and unavoidable vagueness of standards in
general. Each shall be considered in turn.
A. Relative Utility Framework: If the continuing use of necessarily
indeterminate standards is taken as a given, three reasons suggest that ex
ante standards are preferable to ex post standards.
1)

Institutional Constraints Favor Limited Principles. Law crafters
have at least some structural incentive toward restraint in the process
of formulating standards. In order to pass laws, they must build
consensus with other legislators, many of whom will have
constituents whose lives will be adversely affected by overbroad
limiting schemes. As discussed previously, the deliberative process
can have a tempering effect, which contributes to the quality of the
ultimate product.
Standards Likely More Tailored than Ex Post Maxims. Even
imperfectly constructed ex ante standards are still likely to be more
limited than general equitable maxims. Even a standard as
seemingly vague as reasonableness is likely to include, in some
form, external referents by means of which it may be defined more
precisely. These referents may take many possible forms, from
materials produced during legislative deliberations to those values
expressed in the legal literature of the time; relatively speaking,
however, they bear at least some connection to observable practices.
From the perspective of an ex ante decision-maker, this standard is
preferable to an abstracted moral imperative lacking contextual
clarifiers.108
Cabining Effect of Precedent. In the context of judicial
interpretation of standards, precedent has a binding effect; this not
only allows ex ante reliance on past interpretive precedents, but also
enables persistently problematic standards to be clarified and revised
by the crafters of law—again, a testament to the view that law ought
to be viewed as evolutionary rather than static. Conversely,

2)

3)

108
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precedent may exemplify a given equitable norm, but does not bind
its subsequent invocations—after all, the utility of equity emerges
from its role as an ex post remedy. Thus, where reliance interests
and the evolution of law are concerned, even imperfect ex ante
standards are preferable to ex post equity judgments. The goals
reflected in the normative judgments that are made by society (both
at the legislative level and the level of their constituents) may be
described, broadly, as equitable. These judgments inform which
rules and standards become legally and culturally entrenched over
time. In view of Leff’s critique, then, precedent works to restrict the
degree to which a “judge’s own state of mind” 109 impacts the
ultimate judgment handed down. The ex ante/ex post distinction,
however, is critical: equity as understood in the ex ante context
refers to a generalized, if somewhat indeterminate, moral objective,
whereas equity in the ex post context refers to acts of judicial gapfilling in accord with the maxims of equity. Such gap-filling by the
judiciary, where not closely consonant with the ex ante laws in
question, stymies the evolution of the law itself.
B. Intrinsic Vagueness Framework: One might reject the heretoforesketched idea of a continuum of determinacy by which individuals may be
more or less able to predict the legal outcomes of particular actions. For
instance, requirements foreclosing bad faith in contract dealing are broadly
established as ex ante standards110: is it possible to anticipate, as a party
contemplating entering an agreement, whether one will be subsequently
charged with bad faith in the deal-making process? It would appear,
proponents of a non-continuum-oriented view might charge, that on balance
a system favoring ex ante rulemaking is no less subject to the uncertaintybased pitfalls faced by a system incorporating ex post equitable remedies.
In response, it first bears note that indeterminacy in norm-setting is
problematic whether it occurs ex ante or ex post,111 and such indeterminacy
adversely implicates reliance interests in both cases. Moreover, actions
occurring within the domain of a badly bounded law also offer little in the
109
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way of meaningful information for those seeking to construct meaningfully
specific laws. Accordingly, the objector’s point is well taken: a law that
affords excessive interpretive discretion (including by way of over-vague
standards) is problematic and should likely be more closely tailored.112
Some standards will, assuredly, be either overinclusive or underinclusive,
but unlike the traditional equitable maxims (whose persistence in the
common law, in some general form, is offered by Professor Smith as a
grounds for asserting their continuing utility),113 ex ante standards can be
more precisely calibrated. Instances may exist where this calibration fails to
occur, but the possibility of doing so remains available in relative
perpetuity.
That being said, within a framework that has rejected ex post equity
in favor of ex ante rules and standards, the existence of close cases where
outcome indeterminacy persists does not itself constitute an affirmative
argument for the use of ex post equity. All proceedings will not be close
cases hinging on a finding of good faith versus bad faith; where the law that
determines an outcome is not itself closely contingent on the interpretation
of a particular standard, equity should not be invoked ex post to ameliorate
an outcome deemed undesirable. 114 In short, a degree of unavoidable
indeterminacy may persist (particularly in areas where rule crafters display
a tendency to favor standards over rules), but at the very least,
indeterminacy arising from ex ante standards (as opposed to general
equitable maxims) likely exists within narrower discretionary bounds: the
substantive ex ante doctrines from which a judge may reason are generally
fleshed out to a greater degree than are the maxims of equity, enhancing the
possibility of meaningful reliance.
Moving beyond these arguments from pragmatic impact, the
Conclusion addresses the moral questions surrounding opportunism and
equity, and offers a justification for the paradigmatic framework through
which the foregoing analysis has unfolded, before ending with an argument
for rethinking the intersection of law and equity.
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CONCLUSION: THE MORAL QUANDARY OF OPPORTUNISM
Throughout the preceding analysis, this Article does not seek to
justify or validate opportunistic practice—nor CMO in particular—as an
intrinsic moral good. This Article’s scope is limited to offering a functional
theory of opportunism (in both its generalized and CMO forms) as a trigger
for legal evolution, as well as a normative case that ex ante laws are
generally preferable to the use of ex post equity (where reliance interests
and effective development of law over time are the key evaluative criteria).
This Article has previously described opportunism as amoral; this
should be understood as contending that opportunism as defined here—selfinterested behavior that is legal but unanticipated—is amoral in itself, but
may be immoral in a given context. Casting all forms of opportunism as
intrinsically immoral risks, as previously discussed, rendering opportunism
a non-cognizable phenomenon: it is no easy feat to accurately discern the
motives behind a given norm. Definitions of opportunism must thus
differentiate between generally strategic conduct, which may not be
harmful, and the morally problematic phenomenon that is CMO.
Professor Smith writes, “Models of self-interest combined with
asymmetric information can explain a lot of the behavior we would call
opportunistic. Also, if opportunism is simply playing outside the rules then
it reduces to imperfect enforcement.”115 This characterization insinuates that
self-interested behavior, in areas where the law has not explicitly regulated,
is in some way immoral or socially destructive—an assumption that is not
substantiated in depth—yet the characterization also recognizes that some
forms of self-interest-seeking behavior are especially pernicious. While
legal conduct and moral conduct may well be at odds, this does not
necessitate that extra-legal conduct is always immoral. The kind of behavior
challenged by Professors Smith116 and Williamson117 involves conduct that
is broadly antagonistic to the anticipated effect of a given law—conduct
here termed CMO. The equitable countermeasures proposed by counteropportunistic theorists, however, adversely impact both general
opportunism (which one might also describe as “strategic behavior”) and
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CMO: though CMO should indeed be policed, for both moral and practical
reasons, a different solution is required.
To revisit the hypothetical case of Malevolent Motors, an
appropriate avenue for counteracting the company’s CMO behavior could
take the form of a newly enhanced ex ante law regulating driver-for-hire
services above and beyond taxicab companies. Crucially, the need to
expand this law would likely not have been clear without Malevolent
Motors’ conduct actually occurring and being identified as harmful; the
very essence of Malevolent Motors’ conduct is that it was unanticipated.
Penalties for violation of the law might be attached to this enhanced ex ante
rule, which in turn could carry a punitive force beyond disgorgement of
illicitly reaped profits. This would have the effect of maximally deterring
Malevolent Motors’ undesirable conduct without triggering the trapdoor
effects of equity. Moreover, a rule evolving in this sort would not
automatically disincentivize strategic (non-CMO) behavior: a company
operating within legal loopholes, in a socially advantageous way, could still
do so without the immediate fear of an adverse judgment in equity.
A brief note on the scheme of legal philosophy within which this
analysis exists: the evolutionary portrait of law outlined here exists
generally within the contours of the positivist tradition.118 From a metaethical standpoint, however, the process by which law changes to reflect
changes in social values may well reflect an ever-increasing cognizance of
the higher norms that exist within a realist framework. Ergo, to recognize
the phenomenon of opportunism as a driver of important structural changes
in law is not to automatically espouse a utilitarian morality. 119
Simply put, that conduct which is socially destructive or bad—
conduct that likely falls within the boundaries of CMO—should be
addressed at the ex ante level. The acts of agents engaging in forms of
opportunism, whether benign or CMO, determine what society labels as
socially destructive or elects to permit; such determinations are then
codified via the legislative apparatus. Additionally, as discussed above,
such a process allows for the attachment of non-disgorgement punitive
sanctions to the rule set deployed. This is the crucial point where Professor
118
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Smith’s analysis encounters argumentative difficulties.120 He writes, “There
is little to be gained and much to be lost by allowing people to easily
contract around an equitable safety valve.”121 Indeed, some norms must
govern the process by which contracts are formulated, but such norms are
rendered more specific and more effective as information enters the system
and instances of opportunistic conduct (including cases of CMO) are
repeatedly adjudicated. The ex ante structures established through such a
process may work to achieve equitable, counter-CMO ends—for instance,
as in Riggs, by preventing a wrongdoer from being enriched by his
misdeeds 122 —without the need for ex post equity (even as a “safety
valve”).123 The very presence of this safety valve defuses any momentum
toward reform of the ex ante processes and norms.124 Where fighting CMO
is the goal, precision in rule setting is acutely important, and that precision
is best achieved by ensuring that rule-makers have access to information
regarding the behavior of self-interested actors.
A final word is warranted on the broad trajectory of law and equity
in light of this evolutionary portrait. From a perspective that recognizes the
inevitability of normative change over time, separating law and equity into
distinct judicial tools (and using both interchangeably as discrete
instruments, invoking equity when a situation is assessed to be
“problematically opportunistic”) is the least desirable scenario. This not
only disincentivizes reliance, given that assumptions made based on ex ante
legal rules and standards may be invalidated by ex post acts of judicial
discretion, but it also offers no structural incentive for laws to develop.
Integrating the use of both law and equity, as contemporary courts have
generally done, is preferable to their explicit separation, but it may have the
effect of obscuring (by committing to ex post judicial discretion) areas
where the law itself should evolve via the conventional lawmaking process.
The conceptual framework proposed here, which challenges the
argumentative rationales for employing ex post equity, provides for the
incorporation of punitive sanctions as a strong deterrent against socially
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adverse conduct—sanctions which must be meaningfully attached to ex ante
requirements in order to remain philosophically defensible.
The optimal scenario entails a translation of the moral goals sought
by equity—suppression of CMO conduct—into the discursive process of
lawmaking at an ex ante level. In this vision, equity is understood not as an
actual instrument used to sidestep a “bad” judicial outcome, but rather as a
more abstracted aim that may underpin the formulation of ex ante rules in
order to thwart perpetrators of CMO. What is needed is not second-order
law but second-order architecture—law crafted in accordance with popular
normative expectations to achieve equitable outcomes. If law is ultimately
to flourish and respond to changing cultural needs, it must evolve within a
society that seeks, but does not seek to do, equity.

